Elusive Doctrine

Reading the news in recent weeks has provided a number of compelling calls for action. News articles with introductory sentences like the ones below have filled the pages of our news papers and grabbed the attention of concerned readers;

•  An estimated 20,000 people have fled the urban centre since fighting broke out in the area last week.
•  The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator has voiced concern over the plight of civilians affected by the recent fighting.
• The United Nations Mission today voiced its growing concerns over the civilian impact of the continuing operations by the Army against a rebel group operating in the country’s south.
• At least one person has died and up to 10 others were injured after protesters clashed with police.
• United Nations agencies prepared today to rush in aid as rebels reported that civilians are being targeted.
• Government attacks on civilians have dramatically increased in recent weeks without signs of abating.

It's difficult to see news like this, day after day, and remain complacent and uninvolved. But that is exactly what most of the world has done...regarding Sudan. OK, that's not quite fair, one of the lines above is actually about Libya. I'll leave it as an exercise for the reader to decide which one.

It is an understatement to say that an identifiable doctrine regarding the US approach to recent events in the middle east is elusive. The decision to take lives or to risk lives in armed conflict is, and should be, the most difficult decision ever undertaken by a President of the United States. President Obama talked a lot about the responsibility of the United States in Monday night's speech on the situation in Libya. He mentioned a responsibility to act "when our interests and values are at stake", but he made little effort to clarify what vital US interests are at stake in Libya that might justify the expenditure of American blood or treasure. That may not be a fair expectation though. Robert Gates acknowledged on "Meet the Press" this week that Libya was "not a vital interest for the U.S., but we clearly have interests there". So expecting our interests to be 'vital' in order to justify military action may be setting the bar too high for the administration,.

Obama laid out the case for intervention using a rationale that holds no consistency with the US stance regarding similar situations. Logic demands to know what is unique about the situation in Libya that sets it apart from places like Sudan when the case for action is being made. Unfortunately, there is little comfort in speculating on those questions. Obama rationalized his chosen course as an act of cooperation with other States that wanted to restrain Qaddafi. He did not address how the existence or absence of US vital interests may have played into his decision. He did not offer any insight into whether this is an action that the US should have considered pursuing independently if other countries were not trying to persuade him into signing on. The question should be asked if there is ever a circumstance in which the US should take part in a coalition to pursue an action that it would not consider pursuing unilaterally. Any President that puts US forces in harms way as a result of international peer pressure has failed his office.

After September 11th, 2001 Qaddafi began efforts to amend his ways in order to avoid getting caught up in the conflagration of the war on terrorism. It would be ludicrous to consider him an ally even after his attempts to reform and cooperate with efforts by the Bush administration to remove WMD components from Libya. Qaddafi is a bad guy and he has been since before most of the US troops engaged in the conflict against him today were born. There is some irony in the fact that his destruction comes upon him in a more moderate part of his time on earth. But the irony is certainly grim, it is not an option for him to continue in power at the conclusion of this action.

Obama's claims that it is not a requirement to remove Qaddafi from power are either simple rhetoric or they are the  height of naivete. The option of Qaddafi remaining in power was destroyed by the first US cruise missile to arrive in Libya. Qaddafi will never again believe that diplomatic overtures or cooperation in the war on terror will insulate him from harm and it is unrealistic to expect him not to return to his old ways. Whatever limited scope Obama may have had in mind at the outset of the conflict, he can not afford to stop short of removing Qaddafi now.  The roulette wheel of US foreign policy under Barack Obama will leave us to deal with the completely unknown quantity that makes up the rebellion in Libya. We can 'hope' that the 'change' will be better, but there is only one way to find out.