Thursday, May 28, 2026

It’s Time to End the H-1B Visa Program Entirely

Over 29 years as a practicing engineer and engineering manager in the tech industry, one fact remained clear: there was never a need for the H-1B visa program. It needs to be ended. Not reformed, not tweaked — ended. The program that was sold as a way to bring in “the best and brightest” has instead become a routine tool for wage suppression, career disruption, and displacement of American workers. The human and economic costs far outweigh any claimed benefits.The Numbers Don’t Justify the DamageThe modern H-1B program was launched in 1990 with a 65,000 annual cap. Today, after peaking at nearly 200,000 in the early 90s, it sits at 85,000 new cap-subject visas per year (65,000 regular + 20,000 master’s exemption). The total population of H-1B principals is estimated between 600,000 and 800,000, plus roughly 500,000 H-4 dependents — around 1.2–1.3 million people. Extending beyond those currently in the program to include those who came to the US under the H1 program and have since changed status and remain in the US roughly doubles the number. 
These numbers sit inside a U.S. professional and specialty occupation workforce of roughly 70–75 million. On paper, the numbers don't look huge. Yet the disruption to American careers is massive and recurring. It reaches well beyond the specific number of jobs.What I Saw on the Ground as a ManagerIn nearly three decades of hiring, managing teams, and living through multiple boom-bust cycles, I never encountered a single role that genuinely could not be filled by a qualified U.S. worker. The required attestations of hiring managers were generally no more than thoughtless paperwork theater. Hiring managers would sign off that “no U.S. candidate could fill the role,” while capable American engineers were available — often sitting right in the layoff pool from the previous round, trying to put their lives back together.
H-1B hires did not raise the average skill level of our teams. They were often competent contributors, but generally not standouts who possessed irreplaceable expertise or illusive skills. And on compensation? In practice, their offers aligned with what similarly experienced Americans commanded for direct hire positions. Contractors, or temporary agency employees were paid less, sometimes significantly, and were generally lower skilled, sometimes significantly.The Layoff–Hire Cycle That Harms AmericansThe pattern became predictable:
  1. Boom times → aggressive hiring, including H-1B.
  2. Downturn → mass layoffs hitting mid-career and senior U.S. workers hardest.
  3. Recovery → rebuild with younger, lower-cost talent, frequently through H-1B channels.
Recent years have seen over 100,000 tech layoffs in early 2026 alone, on top of prior waves. Many experienced engineers remain sidelined, underemployed, or forced out of the field. A modest 0.5–1% draw from the professional talent pool (350,000–750,000 people) could easily meet legitimate demand if companies were required to prioritize Americans. Instead, the global pipeline proves too convenient and too cheap.Exemptions for Non-Profits and Higher Education Make It WorseThe problem runs even deeper because of broad cap-exempt status granted to universities, affiliated non-profits, nonprofit research organizations, and government research entities. These employers can hire unlimited H-1B workers outside the annual cap and with lighter oversight.
This exemption floods academic, research, and non-profit labs with foreign talent while thousands of experienced American engineers — many with advanced degrees and proven track records — sit sidelined. These are exactly the kinds of roles that sidelined U.S. workers could pursue: teaching, research, project leadership, and specialized technical positions. Instead of tapping the domestic pool of capable professionals who already understand American institutions and have decades of adaptability, institutions often default to the easier H-1B pipeline. This further shrinks opportunities for experienced Americans and expands the overall H-1B footprint well beyond the official 85,000 cap.Wages, “Skill Gaps,” and Other MythsH-1B workers are paid less: H-1B workers earn roughly 15–16% less than comparable U.S. natives after controlling for education, experience, and location. A large share of petitions are filed at the lowest prevailing wage tiers — often well below local medians for computer and engineering roles, but the numbers are misleading.
These numbers can be confusing because they lump all H-1B holders into the same group, and give the impression that these might be lower skilled jobs Americans don't want. A major factor in this misconception is the use of "body shop" hires. The direct hire H-1B engineer is  paid at the same scale as his similarly skilled US counterpart. Onshore outsourcing firms pay their employees significantly less. They account for about half of the H-1Bs, driving down the average.
Outdated US workers: The “rapid tech change negates the skills of older engineers” argument is a canard. As engineers, adapting to new tools, languages, and methodologies is routine. We’ve done it for decades. The real issues are age discrimination (callback rates plummet after 45–50), recency bias, and corporate preference for cheaper, more malleable hires. Experienced Americans are not obsolete — they’re overlooked.The Case for Ending H-1BThe program’s defenders claim it brings innovation and fills shortages. In practice, it has delivered:
  • Wage stagnation and suppression in key occupations (which is probably a feature to corporate supporters, not a bug)
  • Career volatility for American families
  • Weak labor market testing and enforcement
  • A permanent incentive structure that favors global outsourcing pipelines — including in universities and non-profits — over domestic talent
We do not need this visa category to attract exceptional foreign talent. Outstanding individuals can still come through employment-based green cards, O-1 extraordinary ability visas, or other targeted pathways that emphasize true excellence rather than volume. The H-1B pipeline, with its low wage floors, weak protections, and expansive exemptions, has outlived the claimed usefulness it never lived up to.
After 29 years watching capable American engineers get sidelined cycle after cycle, I am convinced: ending the H-1B program is the cleanest, most honest solution. Force companies and institutions to compete vigorously for U.S. talent. Raise wages where shortages are real. Invest in domestic training and recruitment. Treat experienced American engineers as the valuable resource they are.
The data, the economics, and firsthand observation all point in the same direction. It’s time to shut it down, it's always been time to shut it down.
Endnotes / Sources
  1. H-1B program created by the Immigration Act of 1990; current cap structure (65,000 regular + 20,000 advanced degree exemption) established in 2004.
    https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations/h-1b-cap-season
  2. Estimated active H-1B principals: 600,000–800,000 (2026 estimates).
    https://peterchu.com/blogs/medium-feed/how-many-h1b-visa-holders-in-usa
  3. Broader population including H-4 dependents: ~1.2–1.3 million.
    https://peterchu.com/blogs/medium-feed/how-many-h1b-visa-holders-in-usa
  4. U.S. professional/specialty occupation workforce: ~70–75 million (BLS Management, Professional, and Related Occupations).
    https://www.bls.gov/emp/
  5. H-1B workers earn approximately 15–16% less than comparable U.S. natives (adjusted for education, age, gender, occupation, industry, and location): George J. Borjas, NBER Working Paper 34793 (2026).
    https://www.nber.org/papers/w34793
    https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w34793/w34793.pdf
  6. Recent tech layoffs (2026): Over 100,000 reported in early/mid-2026.
    (Trackers such as Layoffs.fyi and industry reports)
  7. Cap-exempt employers: Universities, nonprofit research organizations, and affiliated entities are exempt from the annual cap.
  8. https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations/h-1b-cap-season
  9. Annual H-1B approvals (including extensions): Often 350,000–400,000+.
    https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/03/04/what-we-know-about-the-us-h-1b-visa-program/
  10. Outsourcing/IT consulting firms dominate new cap-subject approvals.
    USCIS H-1B Employer Data Hub: https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/h-1b-employer-data-hub

Saturday, May 9, 2026

"Green" Hydrogen's Role in 765kV Transmission Demand

While pulling information together for the previous article on the 765kV ESG land grab, I ran across some data indicating that "Green Hydrogen" is a significant part of the demand for pumping energy into the Permian basin, accounting for 22% of the non-Oil & Gas related demand. On further analysis it becomes clear that this is yet another rabbit hole in the ESG weirdness behind plans for thousands of miles of new 765 kV power lines. Let's take a look at what exactly green hydrogen is, why it needs so much grid power if it’s supposed to be clean and renewable-powered, who pays, and who benefits.

What Is Green Hydrogen?

Green hydrogen is hydrogen gas produced through electrolysis using electricity from renewable sources like wind and solar. The goal is for the only byproduct to be oxygen, and the process can have very low carbon emissions.

It stands in contrast to:

  • Grey hydrogen — made from natural gas with no carbon capture (high emissions).
  • Blue hydrogen — made from natural gas with carbon capture and storage (lower but still significant emissions).

Green hydrogen is promoted as a way to decarbonize hard-to-electrify sectors like steel, chemicals, fertilizers, heavy transport, and long-duration energy storage.

The Permian Basin's Potential for Becoming a Green Hydrogen Hub

The Permian has several natural advantages:

  • Copious wind and solar resources.
  • Vast amounts of cheap land.
  • Skilled workforce.
  • Large volumes of produced water that can be treated for electrolysis.
  • Proximity to pipelines and Gulf Coast export markets.

With these factors, plus federal tax credits and state support, the region is positioned as a potential clean hydrogen center. The piece that's currently missing is the pending 765 kV transmission capacity.

The Catch: Why Green Hydrogen Still Needs Major Grid Imports

Here’s where it starts to go bonkers — and ties directly into the 765 kV transmission debate.

Producing green hydrogen at commercial scale is extremely energy-intensive (roughly 50–60 kWh per kg of H₂). To be economical, electrolyzers need to run at high capacity factors (70–95%+). Wind and solar are intermittent, so dedicated renewables alone usually can’t deliver the firm, around-the-clock power these plants want.

As a result, most large Permian green hydrogen projects plan a hybrid model: some dedicated renewables + significant reliance on the ERCOT grid for reliable supplemental power. In ERCOT’s Permian Basin Reliability Plan, green hydrogen accounts for roughly 22% of the additional non-oil & gas load (~2.6 GW out of ~11.7 GW by 2030). These projects are modeled as firm, grid-connected industrial loads needing import capacity — via the new 765 kV transmission lines.

Why Not Use Their Own Hydrogen or Abundant Natural Gas for Backup Power?

Using produced hydrogen for supplemental electricity is theoretically possible but wildly inefficient. Converting electricity → hydrogen → electricity again has round-trip losses of 55–70% or more. It’s far more profitable to sell the hydrogen and pull reliable power from the grid.

Using abundant Permian natural gas for on-site power would be cheap and reliable — but it would disqualify the hydrogen from “green” status and the lucrative federal 45V production tax credit (up to $3 per kg). That credit is often what makes these projects financially viable. Mixing in gas-fired power increases emissions and pushes the project into blue (or grey) territory, reducing its value to buyers and subsidy eligibility.

Environmental Reality Check: Green vs. Blue in Practice

When these projects rely on grid supplemental power (as modeled for the 765 kV justification), the environmental advantage shrinks:

  • Grid-dependent “green” hydrogen in the Permian/ERCOT context: Often 2–7+ kg CO₂e per kg H₂, depending on how much grid power is used and the grid mix during those hours.
  • Blue hydrogen (Permian natural gas + CCS): Realistically 2–9+ kg CO₂e per kg H₂, heavily influenced by methane leakage.

There is a gap, but it's much, much, narrower than the idealized “near-zero green” narrative suggests.

Who Pays and Who Benefits?

Texas ratepayers are largely funding the massive 765 kV buildout (estimated ~$33 billion construction cost) through regulated transmission rates. Texas landowners are donating their land and livelihood through eminent domain and lost property value. Federal taxpayers help make the hydrogen projects profitable via 45V credits. To the utilities and the subsidized industries go the spoils.

Summary

In the context of the Permian’s 765 kV transmission plans, “green” hydrogen isn’t mostly off-grid renewable magic — it’s a large grid load that depends on reliable import power to run profitably and claim subsidies. This is the ironic reality that explains why it shows up as a major driver in ERCOT studies, but the "blue" hydrogen efforts in the Permian, powered by locally abundant natural gas, don't.

It seems reasonably clear that this is another example of a solution in search of a problem. Blue Hydrogen is already operational in the Permian basin at emission rates not that different from what Green Hydrogen can provide there. We're left with questioning if the transmission upgrades are simply powering the next wave of energy-intensive projects chasing federal clean-energy incentives at taxpayer expense.



Sources

All figures and projections drawn from the latest available ERCOT, DOE, and industry analyses as of early 2026. Forecasts can change with new project announcements and policy updates.

Friday, May 8, 2026

A Texas Sized ESG Land Grab

Why are Texans Being Asked to Sacrifice Land, and Fund Thousands of Miles of Massive 765 kV Power Lines?

If you haven't been following energy news in Texas, you’ve probably missed the headlines: plans for up to 4,000 miles of new 765 kV transmission lines, the highest-voltage backbone the state has ever built, to pump energy into one of the most energy rich regions on earth. Landowners are concerned about property impacts, costs are in the billions, and critics aren't convinced it’s all necessary. So what’s really going on?

Diving into the ERCOT studies, utility filings, and industry reports paints a clear picture of what’s driving this massive project—and what would change if key pieces didn’t happen, or if we just said "no".

The Big Picture: Permian Power Hunger

The core of the story is the Permian Basin in West Texas. Oil and gas activity is booming, and operators are rapidly switching from on-site diesel and gas generators to grid electricity. This “electrification” is creating explosive demand growth, beyond local capacity.

ERCOT’s Permian Basin Reliability Plan forecasts the region’s peak load could hit ~23.7 GW by 2030 (with oil & gas alone using ~11.96 GW) and approach ~26 GW by 2038 (oil & gas eating up ~14.7 GW). That’s a huge jump from the ~3.4–4.2 GW on-grid baseline around 2022.

The proposed 765 kV lines (think superhighways for electricity) are designed as import paths to bring reliable power into the Permian from the rest of Texas. These extra-high-voltage lines carry far more power with less loss than the existing 345 kV system—often 2–3x the capacity per circuit—making them the most efficient long-term solution according to ERCOT’s analysis. The plan includes roughly 2,400–3,400+ miles of new right-of-way (plus upgrades), with specific segments like AEP’s ~370-mile Howard-Solstice project and Oncor/LCRA’s 214–244-mile Schleicher-to-Bell County line. The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) approved key elements of the initial 765 kV backbone in 2024–2025.

Why Are Oil & Gas Companies Ditching Gas and Diesel Generators?

This is the single biggest driver in the Permian. Here’s why the shift makes sense for operators:

  • Profits: Grid power is often cheaper than hauling diesel or burning on-site gas. Many operators report savings of roughly $1 per barrel of oil produced. It also avoids the logistics of fuel delivery to remote sites and reduces maintenance on scattered generators.
  • Emissions & ESG Pressure: Publicly traded companies (e.g., ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron) have net-zero or major GHG reduction commitments by 2030. Electrification directly cuts Scope 1 and 2 emissions from combustion equipment, reduces flaring of associated gas, and helps meet investor, lender, and regulatory expectations. Investor demands, lender requirements, and public relations drive this—oil majors align operations with global climate goals while maintaining production growth
  • Reliability & Operations: Grid power is more consistent, scalable, and supports higher drilling intensity, automation, water handling, and data-driven operations. On-site generators face fuel supply risks, higher downtime, and noise issues.

Without this shift, Permian oil & gas grid demand would be ~7–9 GW lower in the early 2030s. Operators would continue relying heavily on behind-the-meter gas-fired or diesel generation, self-provisioned microgrids, or temporary solutions instead of grid imports. That incremental ~8 GW (from the ~4.2 GW 2022 baseline to ~12 GW projected) is the bulk of what these transmission lines are built to serve.

But What About Data Centers and Crypto?

Statewide, hyperscale data centers (AI/cloud) and crypto mining together dominate large-load interconnection queues and are the primary drivers of Texas’s overall explosive energy demand growth. Though it doesn't dominate, it's a major driver in the Permian-specific forecasts being used to justify the 765 kV projects:

  • Breakdown of non-oil & gas load (~11.7 GW by 2030): 
    • – Crypto: ~59% 
    • – Green hydrogen: ~22% 
    • – Commercial/industrial: ~13% 
    • – Data centers: ~6%
  • Combined computing load (Crypto + Data Centers): ~65% of the additional non-oil & gas load — roughly 7.6 GW of the ~11.7 GW by 2030.

Oil & gas electrification remains the dominant near-term driver overall in the Permian (~11.96 GW projected by 2030 versus the ~7.6 GW computing load), but it's clear that there are two industries driving the transmission demand.

The Trade-Offs, the Controversy, and the Crony Capitalism

Proponents say the 765 kV backbone is critical for reliability, will support all energy resources (not just renewables or fossils), and is cheaper long-term than repeated lower-voltage upgrades. ERCOT analysis showed the 765 kV option costs only ~4% more upfront but delivers major efficiency, lower losses, and flexibility benefits. Texas lawmakers accelerated the process with House Bill 5066 (2023), which directed ERCOT and the PUCT to develop a specific Permian Basin transmission plan to support oil/gas growth and faster interconnections.

Critics, however, raise sharp concerns about costs, process, and fairness—often pointing out elements of the project as crony capitalism:

  • Guaranteed Profits for Regulated Monopolies: Transmission is built and owned primarily by incumbent utilities like Oncor, AEP Texas, and LCRA. These companies earn a regulated rate of return (Oncor’s authorized ROE is currently around 9.75%) on every dollar of capital invested, recovered from all ERCOT ratepayers via transmission charges on electric bills. Oncor alone has announced massive capital plans—$36 billion for 2025–2029, then upgraded to $47.5 billion for 2026–2030—driven in large part by transmission growth. Critics point out this creates a built-in incentive for larger, more expensive projects: bigger rate base equals higher guaranteed profits for shareholders, while costs are socialized across every Texas electric customer. Some estimates suggest the full buildout (including financing and maintenance) could eventually approach $80 billion in ratepayer impact, adding $100–$200+ annually to the typical household bill.
  • Right of First Refusal (ROFR) Laws Protect Incumbents: Texas law gives existing transmission owners priority to build new lines connected to their systems. Opponents (including competitive developers, the U.S. Department of Justice in past litigation, and free-market groups) call this textbook cronyism—it blocks competitive bidding that studies show can reduce costs by 15–40%. The Texas ROFR statute has faced constitutional challenges for discriminating against out-of-state competitors.
  • Special Legislation and Regulatory Overreach: HB 5066 was originally pushed by oil & gas interests to fix Permian reliability. But critics—including the Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF), Texas Scorecard, and landowner groups like American Stewards of Liberty—argue it was expanded by PUCT and ERCOT into a much broader statewide 765 kV “superhighway” without sufficient legislative oversight or public input. The compressed approval timeline has been called a fast-track that sidelines ratepayers and landowners. Meanwhile, oil & gas majors get cheaper grid access for their ESG goals, combined computing loads (crypto + data centers) benefit indirectly, and utilities lock in decades of returns—all while residential customers and rural landowners foot the bill through eminent domain and higher rates.
  • Landowner and Ratepayer Impacts: Projects require eminent domain across private land, with critics estimating landowners could lose at least $8.2 billion in property value and use. Compensation is often far below perceived losses.

In short, the structure—government-mandated planning + protected incumbent carriers + fully socialized costs + liberal exercise of eminent domain—demonstrates a classic crony capitalist setup: concentrated benefits for politically connected industries and utilities, and the cost burden for average Texans.

Bottom Line

Why is Texas embarking upon a gargantuan project, taking thousands of miles of private property, and taking on billions in expenses to pump energy into one of the most energy rich regions on the planet?

It's difficult to see this as a smart infrastructure build when it's clear that the Permian Oil & Gas industry is currently operational with off-grid or behind-the-meter solutions, and Big Data has no constraints forcing it to operate in the Permian at all. The 765 kV debate is a proxy for serious, urgent, questions—how do we constrain government to balance business interests, costs, landowner rights, and market principles, in the fastest-growing Energy and Data state in the country—and for the most serious urgent question—amidst all of the high-power, crony corporate wheeling and dealing, who represents the Texans left with the bill, or the loss of their land, or both?


(Direct links to primary documents and studies used for all facts and figures above)

All figures are drawn directly from the cited ERCOT, PUCT, utility, and independent analyses as of the latest available reports (2024–early 2026). Forecasts and costs can evolve with new data, routing decisions, and legal outcomes.